Introduction
The results of the unified national election day, held on September 8, 2013, were unusual for two regional capitals. Yevgeniy Roizman, the candidate of the Civic Platform party won the mayoral election in Yekaterinburg, the capital of the Sverdlovsk Region, and Galina Shirshina, an independent candidate, supported by the Yabloko party, won the mayoral election in Petrozavodsk, the capital of the Republic of Karelia. The nominees of the United Russia, the pro-presidential party, lost the elections in both cities. Soon after their victories, Roizman and Shirshina found themselves under the considerable political pressure (Moses 2015: 191) . Since then, the former has retained his mayoral position, while the latter is no longer mayor of Petrozavodsk. Shirshina was forced out at the end of 2015 as a result of the decision of a more than two thirds majority of Petrozavodsk City Councillors.
Shirshina's recall was forerun by the replacement of direct mayoral elections in Petrozavodsk with the procedure of appointing a city manager, chosen by the City Councillors from nominees put forward by the competition committee, half of whom were nominated by Karelia's governor. Thus, the political autonomy of local self-government in the capital of the Republic of Karelia, which had been one of the most democratic regions of Russia (Petrov, Titkov 2013: 25-28) , reached its lowest level (Gel'man et al. 2008: 227-270 ) within just two years.
What was the causal mechanism which led to the Petrozavodsk mayor to be recalled and the consequent drawing of a line under the history of local self-government in the city? The answer to this question has some theoretical implications. First, the description of the causal mechanism, which foreran the Petrozavodsk mayoral recall, sheds light upon the development of the local political process under electoral authoritarianism which is typical for present-day Russia (Gel'man 2015) . Second, as the direct elections for the Petrozavodsk mayor were eliminated five months prior to Shirshina's recall, this paper checks hypotheses which interpret the abolishment of local elections by the senior authorities' unwillingness/inability to control local political elites (Reuter et al. 2016 ) and the latter's lack of political autonomy (Gel'man et al. 2008: 227-270; Reuter et al. 2016) .
Section 2 contains a literature review and Section 3 a description of the main methodological tool: process tracing. Section 4 contains the hypotheses and the information on the empirical data collection methods. The empirical part of the paper, Section 5, analyses two alternative causal mechanisms, which could have led to the recall of Petrozavodsk mayor. The main results are presented in Section 6.
The recall of popularly elected mayors by city councils is common practice in present-day Russia. The legal mechanics for this procedure were introduced to Russian legislation in May 2009 when then president Dmitry Medvedev initiated the amendments to the Federal Law "On the General Principles of Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation" (hereafter, the Law on Local Self-Government). These provisions allow city councils to get rid of the directly elected mayors under "vaguely defined official malfeasance" (Moses 2010 (Moses : 1433 (Moses -1434 ). Moreover, it became possible to push forward the procedure of recall of directly elected mayors not only via city councillors, but also via regional governors. According to data provided by Moses, from February 2010 to November 2013, 51 mayors, including 26 regional capital mayors, were dismissed (Moses 2015: 189-190) .
At the same time, there is a lack of studies which explain the causal mechanisms for this.
Studies have been more concerned about the related issue of why passing the Law on Local SelfGovernment resulted in the abolishment of direct mayoral elections and their replacement with city-manager governance in several Russian cities and why it make no changes in the others.
(Gel'man, Lankina 2008; Reuter et al. 2016; Golosov, Gushchina, Kononenko 2016) 2 . The general answer to this question, if the focus is on procedural rather than structural causes, is that the local elites lack political salience (Gel'man, Ryzhenkov 2011; Reuter et al. 2016 ) and/or the political disloyalty of mayors Reuter et al. 2016 ) served as the key factors, provoked by the elimination of direct mayoral elections.
According to Reuter et al. (2016) , whose research was based on data collected in 207
Russian cities, the probability of direct mayoral elections being abolished was higher in the regions where the governors were not interested in co-opting the mayors. This was typical for cities where the mayors had few political resources or demonstrated their political independence from the regional authorities. In addition, according to , who conducted an in-depth analysis of local politics in four cities of Russia, it was the opposition of the local elites, interested in the autonomy of local self-government which prevented the regional authorities from abolishing direct mayoral elections.
2 The first wave of mayoral elections elimination began within two years upon the Law on Local Self-Government had come into effect (Gel'man, Ryzhenkov 2011: 460) . This Law did not imply replacement of popularly elected mayors by the appointed city managers (see, e.g. Buckley et al. 2014: 95-96 ) and it did not lead to decrease of the political role of local self-government by default (see, e.g. Campbell 2006; Young, Wilson 2007) . However, the political circumstances of its implementation, defined by the policy of recentralization, launched by Vladimir Putin, resulted in fitting local self-government with the hierarchical model of governance (see, e.g. Ross 2007; ; Gel'man, Ryzhenkov 2011; Golosov, Gushchina, Kononenko 2016).
The main conclusion of these works is that governors serve as the driving force in the abolishment of direct mayoral elections in Russian cities. This was the conclusion of other studies devoted to the issue of local self-government in Russia (see e.g. Makarkin 2007; Gel'man, Lankina 2008; Ross 2009; Moses 2010; Gel'man, Ryzhenkov 2011) . Some scholars also briefly provided the examples of the tools used by the governors for removing undesirable mayors (Ross 2009: 297-298; Moses 2010 Moses : 1434 2013: 13; Gel'man, Ryzhenkov 2011: 455; Buckley et al. 2014: 111) .
However, the literature does not contain a detailed description of the causal mechanisms which resulted in the recall of popularly elected mayors of Russian cities, nor the role of regional governors in the elimination of direct mayoral elections. This work fills this gap.
The case of the mayor recall in Petrozavodsk was chosen for the analysis for two reasons.
First, Petrozavodsk is one of few regional capitals where popular mayoral elections existed until 2015 and where all the preceding attempts of the regional authorities to replace direct mayoral elections by an appointment scheme had ended in failure (Gel'man, Lankina 2008: 57; Gel'man et al. 2008: 264-268) . Second, regional and federal media covered the elections of September 8, 2013 and the political situation in Petrozavodsk in detail, as Galina Shirshina was an independent candidate, supported by the Yabloko party. Consequently, there is a large amount of secondary data which cover every stage of Shirshina's carrier, including the interviews and the comments of the key political actors. All these materials constitute a valuable source base for the research.
The Process Tracing Method
The main analytical tool used is process tracing, which is a method of studying "causal mechanisms in a single-case research design" (Beach, Pedersen 2013: 2) . This method was developed and comprehensively described in George and Bennett (2005) and has become a common research tool for case studies within the past few years (see, e.g. Trampusch, Palier 2016).
The application of process tracing requires four steps (see, e.g. Bennett, Elman 2006: 459-460; Bennett 2008: 704-705; Kay, Baker 2015: 10-18) . The process tracing analysis starts "from a suitably chosen beginning to the end of the story" (Bennett, Elman 2006: 459) . A study begins from an event X, which is the initial step in the causal mechanism. This event results in outcome Y, which is the focus of the research. At the second stage, the researcher formulates the main and alternative causal mechanisms (H), linking the event X with the outcome Y. Each link of these causal mechanisms can be considered as a separate hypothesis (h), which must be substantiated by empirical evidence. Such empirical evidence is coined in the literature as "diagnostic" (Bennett 2008: 208) or "causal-process observations" (Collier 2011: 823) . At the third stage of the process tracing analysis the researcher collects the empirical evidence. Finally, the assessment of the supposed causal mechanisms (H) is performed assessing the validity of each link (h). Assessing the validity of the hypotheses (h), from which the causal mechanisms (H) are derived, is performed by matching them with the collected evidence. For these purposes the process tracing empirical tests (see Table 1 ) are applied (Van Evera 1997: 30-34; Bennett 2010; Collier 2011; Kay, Baker 2015) . Bennett (2010: 210) , Collier (2011: 825) and Kay and Baker (2015: 15) .
A hypothesis passes a straw-in-the-wind test, if there is evidence indirectly connected with it. Passing this test is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for its acceptance; it only provides useful information for the confirmation of a given hypothesis. This test is not decisive (Bennett 2010: 211) . If a hypothesis fails a straw-in-the-wind test, it is weakened just slightly. A hypothesis passes a hoop test, if the evidence connected with it serves as a necessary but not a sufficient criterion for its acceptance. Consequently, if a given hypothesis fails a hoop test, it is discarded. The decision on the evidence's correspondence with the necessity criterion is made by a researcher on the basis of Bayesian logic, usually in its informal application (Kay, Baker 2015; Beach 2016) . A condition X is determined as necessary, in case it "must always precede Y for Y to occur; Y will not occur if X is absent" (Beach, Pedersen 2013: 81) . If a hypothesis passes a smoking gun test, it means that there is at least one sufficient, but not necessary argument, supporting the hypothesis. Such evidence looks very specific in the context of Bayesian logic: it can be hardly discovered, in case the tested hypothesis is not valid (Beach 2016: 470) . The failure of a hypothesis to pass such a test does not reject it. Finally, if a hypothesis passes a doubly decisive test, the evidence serves as a necessary and sufficient criterion for its acceptance. If a hypothesis passes a doubly decisive test, it is confirmed, while in case of failure it is discarded.
The process tracing approach does not imply any order of the test results in relation to the particular hypotheses (h) of the tested causal mechanism (H), in order to reach any conclusion on such a mechanism's validity (Fairfield 2015: 48) . At the same time in the methodological literature there are some general recommendations on this point (see, e.g. Bennett 2010; Collier 2011; Beach, Pedersen 2013; Bennett, Checkel 2015) . In general, if the hypotheses within a given mechanism pass strong tests, for instance, smoking gun or doubly decisive, and do not fail the hoop test, the given mechanism is considered plausible, especially if any of the alternative mechanisms fail the hoop test. Moreover, if the hypotheses systematically pass weaker tests, for example the hoop, it produces a cumulative effect and the analysed mechanism is also considered to be plausible (Beach, Pedersen 2013: 104-105) .
Hypotheses and Data
Galina Shirshina's victory in the mayoral election on September 8, 2013 in Petrozavodsk is taken as the starting point for the further analysis (X), while her dismissal is taken as the endpoint (Y).
The fact that Shirshina had no political background until that time determined this choice. There are two potential causal mechanisms explaining Petrozavodsk mayor's dismissal.
Within the first mechanism (H 1 ) it is supposed that Shirshina's recall was initiated by the Karelian authorities, namely by the governor, who had failed to control her performance. It became possible to oust Shirshina from office by side-lining the local elites, namely, Shirshina's supporters Popov and Alikhanov (see Table 2 ).
The outcome observed under this causal mechanism (Y), simultaneously serves as a link between X and Z. If we suppose that the Karelian authorities decided to recall Shirshina from office due to their inability to control her performance, they would have chosen an absolutely loyal person as the Petrozavodsk mayor (Z). For this reason h 6 , which has no direct connection with the causal mechanism, was placed between X and Y. Thus, the outcome of Z and h 6 , which are beyond the H 1 causal mechanism, are an additional argument in favour of its validity. The Karelian authorities try to control the performance of the newly elected Petrozavodsk mayor h 2 The Karelian authorities fail to control Shirshina h 3 The Karelian authorities decide to remove the Petrozavodsk mayor from office h 4 The Karelian authorities obtain control over the majority of the Petrosovet deputies, who have legal powers to recall the city mayor with a two thirds majority h 5 The Karelian authorities look for reasons the Petrosovet deputies can use to recall the mayor h 6 The Karelian authorities ring-fence themselves from the risks of disloyalty of the mayor to replace Shirshina Y, h 7 The Petrosovet dismisses Shirshina Z
The new mayor of Petrozavodsk is loyal to the Karelian authorities As opposed to this causal mechanism it is also important to test an alternative (H 2 ) which is defended by the Karelian officials and the loyal deputies of the Petrosovet 5 . In accordance with this causal mechanism (H 2 ), Shirshina was dismissed because the deputies of the City Council found her work unsatisfactory, namely they claimed that Shirshina failed to fulfil her obligations within a three-month period (see Table 3 ).
Contrary to the first causal mechanism (H 1 ), the second (H 2 ) is much shorter, as it contains only the obvious facts of Shirshina's non-fulfilment of her obligations, the discovery of this fact by the City Council deputies, and Shirshina's subsequent dismissal.
A search of the empirical evidence relating to the links of the proposed causal mechanisms, included interviewing the members of the political elites, analysis of newspaper reports and the data provided by the official web-sites of the Petrosovet, the Karelian Assembly and Karelian government. Official documents, namely the Petrosovet decisions, were also considered. The majority of the Petrosovet deputies suggest that all the necessary grounds for Shirshina's dismissal, namely her non-fulfilment of her obligations within a three-month period, are present.
Y
The Petrosovet dismisses Shirshina According to the methodological literature, non-probability sampling is preferred to elite interviewing when applying process tracing (Tansey 2007; Lynch 2013: 40) . Within this study purposive sampling, a kind of non-probability sampling, was used. The interviewees were chosen in accordance with the characteristics essential for this research (see, e.g. Tansey 
Empirical Analysis
In this section two causal mechanisms proposed as an explanation of recall of Petrozavodsk mayor Galina Shirshina are analysed in turn. Firstly, the mechanism by which Shirshina was dismissed due to the purposive actions of the regional authorities (H 1 ) will be considered.
The evidence shows that the Karelian authorities tried to take control of Shirshina's mayoral performance (h 1 ). For example, in November 2013, when Shirshina initiated some personnel changes in the city administration, Oleg Gromov, the first deputy governor, was opposed to her appointment of Evgeniya Sukhorukova to the positions of the deputy mayor and chairperson of the city's Committee of Economics and Municipal Facilities. Gromov was unsatisfied by Sukhorukova's administrative background, and that Shirshina had not agreed upon Sukhorukova's appointment with the regional authorities 6 . Besides Gromov, the Karelian governor Aleksandr Khudilainen also recommended Shirshina implement her personnel policy with his consent 7 . These facts constitute sufficient evidence for coming to the conclusion that the senior Karelian authorities tried to control the performance of Petrozavodsk mayor (smoking gun).
Shirshina's decision to appoint Sukhorukova as the deputy mayor, despite the distinct opposition of the regional authorities, is necessary and sufficient evidence of their failure to control Shirshina's actions (doubly decisive). By making this decision Shirshina clearly showed that she would not follow "the rules of the game" which the Karelian officials tried to impose (h 2 ).
The following evidence also shows that the Karelian authorities' attempts to control Shirshina failed (h 2 ). On January 20, 2014 Shirshina dismissed Oleg Dezhurov, who was the creature of the Karelian governor and was appointed to the position of the first deputy mayor of Petrozavodsk at the beginning of June 2013 under Shishina's predecessor. Contrary to the previ-ous evidence, this is "only" a sufficient but not necessary (smoking gun) condition for the confirmation of the second link (h 2 ) of the first causal mechanism.
Beside these arguments, there is also indirect (straw-in-the-wind) evidence, showing that the Karelian authorities failed to control Shirshina. From the end of November 2013, when Shirshina refused to agree upon her personnel policy in Petrozavodsk city administration with the regional officials, up to the end of her term in December 2015, Shirshina's activities had been negatively assessed in the governmental official paper Karelia (see Figure 1) . The criticism of Shirshina in Karelia paper, serves also as indirect (straw-in-the-wind) evidence that the Karelian authorities decided to dismiss Shirshina (h 3 ). However, there are other pieces of evidence substantiating this hypothesis.
At the end of April 2014, on the eve of the Petrosovet's regular session, Pavel Sandberg, an active member of the For Petrozavodsk deputy faction, which was established with the support of the Karelian authorities 8 , stated that he was going to assess Shirshina's activity as unsatisfactory on the basis of her 2013 annual report, and in this he was supported by some other depu- Within the first causal mechanism (H 1 ), it is supposed that the regional authorities were directly or indirectly searching for the grounds for Shirshina's recall (h 5 ). According to the data, provided by the interview with Dmitriy Makeev, the Petrosovet deputy, it was revealed that the regional Executive Committee (ispolkom) of the United Russia party was searching for such grounds, not the Petrosovet deputies 30 . This evidence is a substantial, though an indirect confirmation of participation of the regional authorities in removing Petrozavodsk mayor from office
(straw-in-the-wind).
More detailed information was obtained during the interview with Galina Shirshina: "I know that for about six months prior to my dismissal a man called Bekhov, arrived in the city.
[
…] I was told that he was a lawyer who had been working with the Just Russia party. […] Later he was bought by Khudilainen. Bekhov came to the Petrosovet requested some documents. It is obvious that he was searching for those very grounds for my dismissal." 31
The fact that a Karelian politician told Shirshina that Bekhov was working for
Khudilainen, is neither a necessary, nor sufficient condition. It cannot be considered as a sufficient basis for making the conclusion, that Bekhov was fulfilling the order of the regional governor to search the grounds for Shirshina's recall, however, it is quite possible. On December 25 over two thirds of the Petrosovet deputies voted for Shirshina's recall for the non-fulfilment of her mayoral obligations during a three-month period 39 . The head of the Republic of Karelia, Aleksandr Khudilainen, approved that decision 40 .
The fact that a person loyal to the Karelian authorities became the head of the city upon Shirshina's dismissal (Z) is an element beyond the considered causal mechanism (H 1 ). However, such an outcome is expected if we suppose that Shirshina was dismissed for her unwillingness to obey "the rules of the game" imposed by the Karelian officials.
According to the amendments made to the Charter of Petrozavodsk on August 5, 2015, a head of the city must be elected by the Petrosovet deputies from candidates selected by a competition committee, half of which is elected by a representative body, and the other half is appointed by the head of the Republic 41 . This fact clearly shows that the competition committee could not have an anti-governor majority. Moreover, the other half of the competition committee was formed by the Petrosovet deputies, absolutely loyal to the regional authorities, which criticized The analysis of the first causal mechanism (H 1 ) shows that each link has proof. The evidence, concerning h 1 , h 2 , h 3 and h 6 met at least one sufficiency criterion, while the evidence, concerning h 4 and Z, meet the criterion of necessity. Despite the lack of evidence meeting the necessity or sufficiency criteria for h 5 , two pieces of evidence passing two straw-in-the-wind tests allow us to take it into account. The combination of the collected evidence (Collier 2011: 827) leads to the conclusion that the causal mechanism according to which Shirshina's recall is thought to be initiated by the senior Karelian authorities (H 1 ) seems to be valid.
At the same time, according to the opinion of some Petrosovet deputies loyal to the Karelian authorities "the reasons for [Shirshina's] recall go no further than the economic issues." 44 Thus, it is necessary to examine the causal mechanism explaining the dismissal of Petrozavodsk mayor by her non-fulfilment of the obligations during a three-month period (H 2 ) 45 .
This mechanism is much shorter than the first one because it only supposes that Shirshina failed to fulfil her obligations (h 1 ), and that consequently the Petrosovet deputies found her inaction sufficient for her dismissal for the non-fulfilment of her obligations during a three-month period (h 2 ).
It is difficult to assess within the research, if Shirshina actually failed to fulfil her obligations during this period. Moses (2010 Moses ( : 1434 points out that "non-fulfilment of obligations during a three-month period" is an ambiguous definition, which was entered into Russian legislation in order to give governors an opportunity to initiate recalls of obstinate mayors via the subordinated city councils.
On January 21, 2016 the City Court of Petrozavodsk, where Shirshina was fighting this reason for her dismissal, considered the range of the grounds in favour of Shirshina's recall, presented by the Petrosovet, as sufficient for the dismissal of her claim 46 . This fact serves as a nec-essary condition for validity of the first link (h 1 ) of the second causal mechanism (hoop) 47 . Nevertheless, all the four grounds considered sufficient for Shirshina's recall by the court, illustrate that the problems, endemic for the city, remained during her governance. Among these problems are lack of a social housing for low-income citizens, a lack of municipal kindergartens, nonfulfilment of storm drainage repair and the unsatisfactory condition of a pontoon bridge in one of the city districts 48 . The solution to these problems is a complicated task for any mayor of Petrozavodsk given the permanent deficit of the city budget 49 .
The second link (h 2 ) of the causal mechanism (H 2 ) is based the Petrosovet deputies noticing the grounds for the mayor's dismissal and, consequently, initiating the recall procedure. This hypothesis faces at least two serious objections.
At first, the attitude of the Petrosovet deputies to the mayor dramatically changed within the three-month period from December 17, 2014 we come to the conclusion that the Petrosovet changed its attitude to Shirshina not due to her supposed inaction within the period from December 2014 to March 2015, but for some other reason. As a result, the second link (h 2 ) of the causal mechanism fails a hoop test.
Second, the list of the grounds for Shirshina's recall included the problem of the unsatisfactory condition of a pontoon bridge in one of the city districts. The deputies claimed that Shirshina's administration did not try to resolve this problem 53 . However, according to the deci- 47 The fact that Petrozavodsk City Court found Shirshina's recall legal, is not considered as a necessity and sufficiency criterion, confirming the first link (h 1 ), according to which Petrozavodsk mayor failed to fulfill her obligations during the period over three months. The point is that the judicial system in modern Russia is closely connected with the executive system. That is why courts often make decisions, profitable for the representatives of executive branch, especially concerning the political cases (see, e.g. Paneiakh 2015 The analysis of the second causal mechanism (H 2 ), according to which Shirshina was dismissed due to her inaction as the mayor of Petrozavodsk, allows us to come to the following conclusion: though the first link (h 1 ) of the mechanism passes a hoop test, the second link (h 2 ) appears to be completely falsified, which, in its turn, constitutes a serious objection to the validity of the second causal mechanism in the whole.
Conclusion
The case of dismissal of Petrozavodsk city mayor Galina Shirshina is examined in detail in this article. On the basis of a large amount of primary and secondary sources the most probable causal mechanism of her dismissal was reconstructed. According to this mechanism (H 1 ), Shirshina's recall was initiated by the Karelian authorities after their failure to control her performance as mayor. The autonomy of the local political elites who supported Shirshina and controlled the majority of Petrozavodsk City Councillors, prevented Karelian officials from a prompt implementation of their plans. Shirshina's recall became possible only when the regional authorities managed to eliminate the influential pro-Shirshina's politicians Devletkhan Alikhanov and Vasiliy Popov, with the support of law enforcement agencies. In order to guarantee the loyalty of the new Petrozavodsk mayor, the Karelian authorities, acting through Petrozavodsk City Council, which had became subordinated to them after elimination of the Alikhanov-Popov group, and through the United Russia deputies in the regional Assembly, abolished direct mayoral elections in the city.
The case of Petrozavodsk illustrates the direct influence that the regional authorities in Russia have on local politics (see, e.g. Gel'man, Lankina 2008; Ross 2009; Moses 2010; Gel'man, Ryzhenkov 2011; Golosov, Gushchina, Kononenko 2016; Reuter et al. 2016) . Moreover, the analysis supports previous studies on the problems of local selfgovernment in Russia -that survival of Russian mayors and preservations of direct mayoral elections in the cities mainly depends on the mayors' willingness to subordinate their action to the regional authorities (Gel'man, Ryzhenkov 2011; Reuter et al. 2016 loyal to regional officials, it leads to conflict between them which results in removal of mayors.
The solution of this conflict as zero-sum game can be postponed if the mayor is supported by the influential local elites . However, the analysis suggests this model can be applied only while these elites maintain their autonomy.
In broader terms the obtained results point at the importance of hierarchical control mechanism under the authoritarian electoral regimes. If the autocrats are not afraid that the lower politicians with a direct electoral mandate will use their resources against them, they are ready to allow direct elections at the lower level, especially if the lower politicians control the electorate, which can be potentially beneficial for the autocrats (Reuter et al. 2016) . However, if the autocrats are involved in a conflict with the lower politicians with a direct electoral mandate, they will probably try to eliminate the disloyal actors and abolish direct elections at the lower level.
